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U.S. Exceptionalism and the Strengthening Process
of the Inter-American Human Rights System
by Francisco J. Rivera Juaristi*
“Our refusal to join in the international implementation of the
principles we so loudly and frequently proclaim cannot help but
give the impression that we do not practice what we preach . . . .
[W]e seriously undermine our own case when we resist joining
in the international endeavor to enforce these rights, which we
ourselves had so much to do with launching.” (Charles Yost,
former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations)1

T

Second, the article describes how this criticism has prompted
increased support for the creation of alternatives to the InterAmerican Human Rights System that would exclude U.S.
participation. Third, it addresses the principal apprehensions
to U.S. ratification of the American Convention and argues
that such concerns are not insurmountable. Finally, the article
concludes that ratification of the American Convention by the
United States is necessary to prevent further erosion of the
Inter-American Human Rights System and of U.S. leadership
in the region.

Introduction

he current reform process of the Inter-American Human
Rights System (IAHRS, System) has as much to do with
evaluating the role of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights (Commission, IACHR) in promoting and
protecting human rights in the region as it does with criticizing and rejecting U.S. exceptionalism2 in matters of regional
human rights law. All of the Spanish-speaking Member States of
the Organization of American States
(OAS), as well as Brazil, Haiti, and
several English-speaking Caribbean
States, have at one point3 ratified
the American Convention on Human
Rights (American Convention).4 Most
OAS Member States have ratified at
least one or more additional regional
human rights treaties.5 All OAS
Member States, except two, have ratified the Inter-American Convention
on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against
Women (Convention of Belém do Pará). The United States has not
ratified any of the OAS regional human rights treaties. This lack of
universal ratification of regional human rights treaties raises serious questions about the effectiveness and legitimacy of the System.

Regional Criticism over U.S. Exceptionalism within
the Inter-American System
Influential regional figures, such as Venezuelan President
Hugo Chávez, Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa, and Bolivian
President Evo Morales, have taken issue with the role the United
States plays in the System. In a not-sosubtle jab at the United States, they
have characterized the System as a tool
used and manipulated by “imperial
powers”6 who refuse to play by the
same rules as other states in the
region. Venezuela’s President Hugo
Chávez justified the state’s decision
to denounce the American Convention
on grounds of reciprocity and lack of
mutuality between all OAS Member
States. He questioned why Venezuela should continue to be
bound by a treaty that does not bind all other OAS Member
States. At the 2012 OAS General Assembly in Cochabamba,
these States, as well as Nicaragua, publicly criticized the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights for allegedly turning
a blind eye to human rights violations in the United States.7 In
his opening speech at that General Assembly, Bolivian President
Evo Morales said that the OAS had two options: “it either dies
as a servant of the [U.S.] empire or revives to serve all of the
nations of the Americas[.]”8 Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa
echoed President Morales’ views.9

Who would not be offended
by the idea that not all states are
equal under the law; that — in
the words of George Orwell —
some are more equal than others?

This article urges the United States to pay its true debt to
the Inter-American Human Rights System by fully engaging
the System and by finally ratifying the American Convention
on Human Rights. First, the article addresses regional criticisms
over U.S. exceptionalism within the Inter-American System.

Although such rhetoric is uncharacteristic in modern diplomatic discourse, it has been well received by the strong popular
bases that brought these presidents to power. For them, the
underlying issues that feed the reform process are concerns
about universality and mutuality of obligations within the InterAmerican System. While mutuality and reciprocity arguments
technically do not apply in the context of human rights treaties
(because these treaties are not between two or more parties,
but rather involve obligations between each State Party and
those under its jurisdiction), such arguments are still very much
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persuasive in the court of public opinion. Who would not be
offended by the idea that not all states are equal under the law;
that — in the words of George Orwell — some are more equal
than others? In fact, “imperialistic” and populist anti-yankee
oratory aside, these presidents may be making a rather legitimate
argument; namely, that if the System is to be effective for some
Member States, it has to have legally
binding authority over all states.

The Commission has established “universal acceptance of the
regional human rights instruments” as one of its strategic objectives for 2011–15. Accordingly, the Commission has announced
it will focus on promoting universal ratification of these instruments and that in 2013, it will write a report on the consequences
of the fact that not all Member States, including the United
States, have ratified the American
Convention and other Inter-American
human rights treaties.13

What is certain is that [. . .]
the current reform process of the
Inter-American System is being
fueled, at least in part, by the
desire to limit U.S. influence over
the System and by resentment
against U.S. exceptionalism.

The United States defends itself
against these criticisms by mentioning
that the Commission has “jurisdiction” over human rights violations
committed within the United States
by virtue of the OAS Charter and in
light of U.S. commitments under the
American Declaration on the Rights
and Duties of Man.10 But full membership in the System requires much
more than that.11 Participation in
hearings before the Commission is
not enough. The System has two
main organs (the Commission and the Court) and five major
human rights treaties (and a Protocol). The United States has not
ratified any of these treaties and barely engages with only one of
the System’s organs.

The call for U.S. ratification of
the American Convention has gotten
louder due to the current debate about
the future of the Inter-American
System. States, NGOs, individuals,
academics, and the Inter-American
Commission, are calling for universal ratification of the American
Convention and other regional
human rights treaties as a way of
ensuring that the System is strong for
all and not just for some. The absence
of U.S. leadership in this area has affected credibility and public
confidence in the System.

Proposals for the Creation of Alternatives to the
Inter-American Human Rights System that would
Exclude U.S. Participation

This idea that the United States must fully participate and
be accountable before the Inter-American System on an equal
footing with other OAS Member States is one that resonates
with most observers, participants, and supporters of the System.
Despite the fervent opposition that civil society organizations
have displayed against the Venezuelan and Ecuadorean proposals during the current reform process, most — if not all — support their call in favor of U.S. ratification of the American
Convention. CEJIL (an influential NGO in the region), for
example, has been very critical of some of the proposals put
forward by states like Venezuela and Ecuador that it considers
may in fact “weaken” rather than “strengthen” the System, but
it has also agreed with those states’ call in favor of universality
and, more specifically, it has agreed with the need for the United
States to ratify the American Convention. In every opportunity
where the issue has come up, whether in forums organized
by the Commission or by academic institutions like American
University, or even in events organized by the OAS Permanent
Council, there is widespread support for the universal ratification of the American Convention by all OAS Member States, but
especially by the United States.

Criticism over U.S. exceptionalism in the region has included
proposals that include not only modification of the current
System,14 but also the creation of alternatives to the InterAmerican Human Rights System that would exclude the United
States (and Canada).15 Such efforts to exclude the United
States from participating in regional organizations are currently
underway.
For example, the Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States (CELAC) was created in 2010 and has a membership of 33 Latin American and Caribbean states. It purposely
excludes the United States and Canada.16 Despite CELAC being
a newcomer in the region, Ecuador has suggested that all OAS
functions be “absorbed by CELAC.”17
Ecuador has also suggested18 that a human rights supervisory organ be created under the auspices of the Unión de
Naciones Suramericanas (Union of South American Nations,
UNASUR).19 The influence of UNASUR in the current debate
about the OAS should not be underestimated. During the
November 2012 Meeting of UNASUR Heads of State, all twelve
Member States,20 with the exception of Venezuela,21 approved
a proposal to request the OAS Secretary General to convoke a
meeting of the 25 States Parties22 to the American Convention
to be held prior to the upcoming March 2013 OAS Special
General Assembly, with the purpose of discussing reforms to
the Inter-American System.23 That is, twelve influential OAS
Member States agreed to exclude the United States from participating in a meeting about the System because the United
States is not a State Party to the American Convention. Other
regional initiatives that exclude the United States, such as the
Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América
(Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, ALBA)24

For example, hundreds of human rights defenders, including
former presidents of Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador, have signed
the Bogotá Declaration, which expresses support for the InterAmerican System. This Declaration includes a demand that the
“States of the region ratify the Inter-American conventions on
human rights as a clear demonstration of their political will to
support the [Inter-American System].” It also specifically urges
“the government of the United States of America to ratify the
American Convention on Human Rights.”12
The Inter-American Commission shares the concerns put
forward by many Member States and users of the System concerning the lack of universal treaty ratification in the region.
20
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and the Cumbres Iberoamericana de Jefes de Estado y de
Gobierno (Ibero-American Conference for Heads of States and
Government),25 are also gaining momentum.

The underlying problem with the first two concerns is the
erroneous presumption that human rights are exclusively of
state or domestic concern. Human rights are inherently of concern to the international community. International human rights
law complements domestic norms and mechanisms where the
latter inadequately protect or fail to guarantee human dignity.
The purpose for the creation and development of international
human rights law was precisely to ensure that basic human
dignity would not be a subject matter of exclusive concern of
governments, whether they are state, local, or federal in nature.

It is unclear how or whether these new regional institutions will substitute the role the Inter-American Human Rights
System has played in promoting and protecting human rights
in the Americas. What is certain is that the creation of CELAC
and ALBA, as well as the aforementioned initiatives within
UNASUR, demonstrate that the current reform process of the
Inter-American System is being fueled, at least in part, by the
desire to limit U.S. influence over the System and by resentment
against U.S. exceptionalism.26

In any case, during the negotiation phase of the treaty drafting process the United States was able to include a federalism
clause in Article 28 of the American Convention, which recognizes that some provisions of the Convention fall under the
jurisdiction of the federal government and others fall under the
jurisdiction of the “constituent units of the federal state.”33 This
clause addresses U.S. concerns about the “federalization” of
issues of state concern from a domestic law perspective.34

The United States should not underestimate the effects
the current reform process of the Inter-American System may
have on U.S. influence over the region. Unless the Obama
Administration takes bold and comprehensive action to fully
engage with the Inter-American System, the United States risks
further erosion of its moral authority as a regional leader in the
protection of human rights.

This clause, however, would not relieve the U.S. federal
government from international responsibility that arises out of
state and local conduct that is incompatible with the American
Convention. General principles of international law establish
that treaty obligations are binding on all government actors,
including state and local officials in federalist forms of government.35 Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela, for example,
are all States Parties to the American Convention and they all
have a federalist government structure.36 The Inter-American
Commission and the Court have declared all four of these federal
states internationally responsible for violations of the American
Convention for actions that involved state, provincial or local
authorities. Federalism, therefore, does not shield the conduct of
its “constituent units” from international responsibility.37 Thus,
U.S. ratification of the American Convention would not require
a federalization of matters that fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of local states, but ratification of this treaty would indicate
that state or federal conduct could give rise to the international
liability of the United States.

Apprehensions Regarding U.S. Ratification of the
American Convention
Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter recently raised the issue
of universality in an op-ed stating: “[T]he universality of human
rights could be achieved if all OAS Member States ratified the
[American] Convention. Universal participation in our hemispheric human rights bodies would affirm and strengthen our
democracies’ commitment to protect human rights.”27
President Carter signed the American Convention in 1977. At
the signing ceremony, he stated, “[T]his blank space on the page
has been here for a long time, and it’s with a great deal of pleasure that I sign on behalf of the United States this Convention.”28
President Carter then requested the U.S. Senate’s consent with
the following statement:
By giving its advice and consent to ratification of [the
American Convention], the Senate will confirm our
country’s traditional commitment to the promotion
and protection of human rights at home and abroad.
I recommend that the Senate give prompt consideration to the treaties and advice and consent to their
ratification.29

It is worth noting that ratification of the American Convention
would not automatically grant the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights jurisdiction over the United States. Pursuant to
Article 62 of the American Convention, the Inter-American
Court can only exercise jurisdiction over those States Parties that
have additionally recognized the Court’s jurisdiction. Thus, the
United States can ratify the American Convention without necessarily having to recognize the Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
although this additional step is completely voluntary in nature,
U.S. recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction would not only be
the right thing to do, but it would also send the right message to
others states in the region.

In 1979, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held
hearings on this issue30 but did not take any further action.
Thirty-five years have passed since President Carter signed
the American Convention, and the Senate still has not given its
consent.31
Apprehensions about ratification of the American Convention
can be divided into three categories.32 First, there are federalism concerns about how ratification could authorize federal
encroachment into matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of
states. Second, there are sovereignty concerns about whether
international legal obligations may interfere with exclusively
domestic affairs. Third, there are concerns about the interpretation of the right to life under the American Convention and its
compatibility with U.S. laws on the death penalty and abortion.

The third category of concerns regarding U.S. ratification of
the American Convention has to do with the interpretation of the
right to life as recognized in Article 4 of the treaty. Specifically,
issues involving the death penalty and abortion are the two main
concerns that seem, at least at first glance, to be problematic.
Nevertheless, a closer examination suggests that such concerns
are also without merit.
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Should the United States choose to ratify the American
Convention, it would not be the only State Party in which the
death penalty is still legal. Guatemala, Jamaica, Barbados,
Dominica, and Trinidad and Tobago all ratified the American
Convention even though at the time of ratification the death penalty was a legal form of punishment in those states.42 Guatemala,
Barbados, Dominica, and Trinidad and Tobago43 included reservations to various aspects of Article 4 when they ratified the
American Convention.

Article 4 of the American Convention recognizes the right to
life “in general, from the moment of conception.” This language
raises concerns that ratification of this treaty could result in a
prohibition of legal abortions in the United States. The “legislative” history and subsequent interpretation of this text suggests
that ratification of this treaty would not affect the right to have
an abortion, nor the right to life of the unborn as understood in
the United States.
U.S. laws on abortion are compatible with the American
Convention. In the “Baby Boy Case” against the United States,
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights clearly
rejected the petitioners’ argument that the American Convention
recognizes an absolute right to life
from the moment of conception,
but it also rejected the argument
that the Convention recognizes an
absolute right to have an abortion
regardless of the circumstances.38
The Commission highlighted that the
phrase “in general” was included in
the text of Article 4 of the Convention
to accommodate those OAS Member
States that, like the United States,
allow abortions under certain circumstances.39 Ratification of the
American Convention, therefore,
would not modify U.S. laws on abortion and, therefore, efforts
to prevent ratification of the American Convention on the basis
of this issue are misguided.

Both President Carter44 and the American Bar Association45
have suggested that the U.S. Senate give its consent to ratification of the American Convention subject to several reservations,46 thus limiting the domestic effect of the most controversial
aspects of the American Convention.
Many other States Parties have added
such reservations to their ratification documents.47 The United States
could similarly ratify the American
Convention and include reservations48 to Article 4 or to other articles
thereof, so long as the reservations
conform to the provisions of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.49 That is, so long as the reservation is compatible with the object
and purpose of the treaty.50

It is time to move past the
lingering fears reminiscent of
the Bricker Amendment era,
when suspicion over international
treaties moved us closer to
international isolationism.

In light of these considerations, continued apprehensions
about U.S. ratification of the American Convention seem to be
based on political reasons and a belief in U.S. exceptionalism,
rather than on legal hurdles. Issues of federalism and self-execution51 of treaties pose no more legal obstacle to ratification
of the American Convention than they did to ratification of the
ICCPR. Thus, there seems to be no insurmountable legal objection for U.S. ratification of the American Convention.

Objections to ratification of the American Convention based
on concerns about the death penalty are equally misplaced. The
American Convention does not prohibit the death penalty per
se. There is an additional protocol to the American Convention40
that OAS Member States can ratify if they want to show their
binding commitment to the abolition of the death penalty, but the
American Convention itself does not abolish the death penalty.
Ratification of the American Convention would not require the
U.S. to abolish the death penalty.

Erosion of Regional U.S. Leadership
in Human Rights

Those provisions of the American Convention limiting the
application of the death penalty are essentially compatible with
current U.S. law.41 These limitations include the following: the
imposition of the death penalty only for “the most serious crimes
and pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court
and in accordance with a law establishing such punishment,
enacted prior to the commission of the crime;” a prohibition
on extension of the death penalty to crimes to which it does
not apply at the time of treaty ratification; a prohibition on the
reestablishment of the death penalty once it has been abolished;
a prohibition of its application to political offenses; a prohibition of the penalty’s application to persons under eighteen or
over seventy at the time the crime was committed, and pregnant
women; and a recognition of the right of every person condemned to death to apply for amnesty, pardon, or commutation
of sentence. Nothing in this list of restrictions is incompatible
with current U.S. federal or state law, especially since the U.S.
Supreme Court decided in the 2005 Roper v. Simmons case that
execution of juvenile offenders (those under the age of eighteen)
was unconstitutional.

The year 2013 marks the 44th anniversary of the adoption of
the American Convention in 1969, and the 35th anniversary of
its entry into force in 1978. The United States actively participated in the drafting process of the American Convention.52 It
now needs to ratify it.
It is time to move past the lingering fears reminiscent of
the Bricker Amendment era, when suspicion over international
treaties moved us closer to international isolationism.53 Human
rights treaties are here to stay, and while most of the states in
the region have moved with the tide of the times, the United
States still needs to join them. The United States led the way in
developing and defining those minimum standards and should
consequently lead the way in adhering to them as well.
In a move reminiscent of Cold War-era paranoia, the U.S.
Senate recently voted not to ratify the UN Convention on the
Rights of Persons With Disabilities because conservatives were
deeply suspicious of the United Nations and argued that the
treaty could relinquish U.S. sovereignty to a UN committee.54
By not ratifying even the most non-justiciable human rights
22
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treaties, such as the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities,55 the United States is distancing itself
from its own perceived image as a beacon of hope for human
rights victims.

United States must act now and engage the System on an equal
footing with other OAS Member States.

Ratification of the American Convention is consistent with
U.S. foreign policy goals of promoting and protecting human
rights.56 Failure to ratify the American Convention signals to
other states that the United States does not support compliance with that treaty. In a region where diplomacy and foreign
relations are often based on misleading notions of reciprocity
and mutuality, the message is clear: if the United States does
not have to comply with the American Convention, neither
should the rest of the region. Remarkably, most other states in
the region have decided not to follow the example set by the
United States. Most have ratified the American Convention
and some have even modified their domestic law, even their
constitutions, to incorporate the American Convention as fully
binding and executable law in their domestic jurisdictions. The

U.S. exceptionalism has left the Inter-American Human
Rights System vulnerable to attacks aimed at undermining its
legitimacy and credibility. The current reform process of the
System presents an opportunity for the United States to take
stronger actions to restore public confidence in the System (and
in the OAS) and prevent the creation of parallel human rights
supervisory organs that lack independence and autonomy. The
United States should lead by example by engaging more actively
with the Commission and by ratifying the American Convention
on Human Rights and other regional human rights treaties.57
Public confidence in the System depends on whether it can be
seen as an effective body that supervises human rights violations
in all OAS Member States, including the United States.

Conclusion and Recommendations
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